Abstract Toehold purchase, defined here as purchase of one share in a firm by an investor preparing a tender offer to acquire majority of shares in it, reduces by one the number of shares this investor needs for majority. In the paper we construct mathematical models for the toehold and no-toehold strategies and compare the expected profits of the investor and the probabilities of takeover the firm in both strategies. It turns out that the expected profits of the investor in both strategies coincide. On the other hand, the probability of takeover the firm using the toehold strategy is considerably higher comparing to the no-toehold strategy. In the analysis of the models we apply the apparatus of incomplete Beta functions and some refined bounds for central binomial coefficients.
time of such an offer, an investor may already own, say, one-share-toehold. In our model the firm is going to be widely held and each shareholder will own one share. Outside investor will make a tender offer to all shareholders if s/he does not own a toehold and to all shareholders excluding self when s/he does own a toehold. For our purposes we consider the terms 'tender offer' and 'bid' as synonyms. Sometimes there is an upper bound on the number of possible stake (shareholding) that the outside investor may hold at the time s/he places a tender offer. Here surfaces one of the questions of toehold literature. If an investor is allowed to hold only a certain fraction of shares when s/he wishes to place a tender offer (but not more), would s/he always want to hold this maximum possible stake? If not, why not? Probably with this question in mind, a number of toehold theories look at optimal toeholds in a variety of settings and under variety of assumptions about market structure, ownership structure (how many shares each shareholder owns), information structure or the number of investors (one, two or more); see Grossman, Hart [9] , Bagnoli, Lipman [1] , [2] , Singh [11] , Ravid, Spiegel [10] , Betton, Eckbo [3] , Bris [5] , Goldman, Qian [8] , Ettinger [7] , Betton, Eckbo, Thorburn [4] , Chatterjee, John, Yan [6] .
Our approach is different in that we specifically assume that there is only one investor who is considering a tender offer and that if this investor does decide to purchase a toehold then s/he purchases only one share. If there is no toehold, then our assumptions follow the lines of Bagnoli and Lipman [1] . If investor purchases a toehold, then the circumstances of the tender offer are different. The difference does not only lie in the fact that the offer is made to one fewer shareholders. In this case investor's tender offer might (and generally would) take into account the effect of potential takeover on the worth of a toehold. Our setting is rudimentary in that there are no asymmetries of information, toehold is one share and key to toehold purchase is either yes or no answer. The two strategies (no-toehold and toehold) of the outside investor are described in Section 2. The main results of Section 2 are Theorems 1 and 2. In Theorem 1 we calculate the principal parameters of the non-toehold strategy: the price of a share X 0 suggested by the investor in the tender offer, the probability σ 0 that a shareholder will sell her/his share to the investor, the probability P 0 of takeover the firm, and the expected profit Π 0 of the investor. In Theorem 2 we calculate the respective parameters X 1 , σ 1 , P 1 , Π 1 for the toehold strategy. Comparing the obtained formulas for these parameters we discovered that both strategies yield the same expected profit Π 1 = Π 0 and the same probability σ 0 = σ 1 that a shareholder will sell her/his share to the investor. On the other hand, the probability P 1 of takeover the firm using the toehold strategy is higher than the corresponding probability P 0 for the no-toehold strategy. This follows from Theorem 3 that yields some lower and upper bounds on the parameters X i , P i , Π i , i ∈ {0, 1}, of our models. The proof of Theorem 3 (presented in Appendix) is not trivial and uses the mathematical apparatus of incomplete beta functions and some nontrivial bounds on the central binomial coefficients. In Section 4 we make some mathematical conclusions that follow from the analysis of our models.
Models
We assume that a firm has 2n + 1 shareholders. Each shareholder owns one share. The worth of each share, if the firm continues to be run by incumbent management, is normalized to 0. There is also an outside investor B who is considering takeover bid. If investor takes over, the value of each share is increased to 1. Now we consider two strategies of the investor B who is willing to take over the firm buying a majority of shares.
0.
The first strategy will be referred to as the no-toehold strategy and its parameters will be labeled by the subscript 0. Following the no-toehold strategy, the investor B makes a tender offer to all 2n + 1 shareholders suggesting a price X for each share. Shareholders decide independently whether to accept or to reject the tender offer. They may use mixed strategies, i.e. accept the offer with certain probability σ. Simple majority of n + 1 shares is necessary for takeover. Tender offer is unconditional in the sense that if less than n shareholder accept the tender offer, then B has to purchase shares from those shareholders who accepted the offer, even though in that case B becomes a minority shareholder, the worth of each share value remains at 0 and such purchase is ex post unprofitable for B as long as X > 0.
Suppose shareholders use symmetric mixed strategies, in which in response to tender offer X all of them accept the tender offer with probability σ ∈ (0, 1) and reject it with probability (1 − σ). For the pair (X, σ) to be equilibrial, each shareholder has to be indifferent between tendering and not tendering her share, or otherwise she would not use mixing strategy. If she tenders, she ends up with X, and if she does not, her unsold stake is worth more than 0 if among remaining 2n shareholders at least n + 1 shareholders tender their shares. That happens with probability
In that case the firm is taken over. A shareholder who did not tender her share remains a minority shareholder who "free-rides" on investor's improvement in firm value from 0 to 1. So the pair (X, σ) can be a suspect for a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium only if
Here by n k = n! k!(n − k)! we denote the binomial coefficients.
The investor's expected profit Π is calculated using three variables: the number of tendered shares, probability that exactly that many shares are tendered, and the share value:
After a suitable rearrangement and substituting for X the sum (1) we obtain:
The maximal value
of the profit of the investor is attained for the probability
that corresponds to the price of a share
In this situation the probability of takeover the firm by the investor equals
The no-toehold strategy will be denoted by S 0 . We summarize our description of this strategy in the following:
Theorem 1 If the investor uses the no-toehold strategy S 0 to take over a firm with (2n + 1) shareholders, then he should offer the price
for a share in the tender offer and can expect to take over the firm with probability
and expect for the profit
To maximize their expected profit the shareholders should sell their shares to the investor with probability
1. Now we consider a more complex strategy S 1 called the toehold strategy. Following this strategy the investor B first tries to purchase one-share toehold from a shareholder A who is aware that B is about to launch a tender offer to acquire majority of shares suggesting the price X 0 for a share. We assume that A is the only shareholder from whom B is able to purchase a toehold, and A agrees to sell her share to the investor B for the price X 0 .
After buying the toehold from the shareholder A, the investor announces a post-toehold tender offer to the remaining 2n shareholders, offering a price X 1 for a share. If σ 1 is the probability that a shareholder will tender her share for that price, then the equilibrium will occur if
which is equal to the probability that among 2n − 1 shareholders at least n will sell their shares. The probability of takeover the firm in the post toehold tender is equal to
and the expected profit Π 1 of the investor for the toehold strategy is equal to
To find the maximal value of the expected profit Π 1 , consider the derivative
and observe that it is equal to zero at
2n+1 the expected profit Π 1 attains its maximal value
The above discussion can be summed up in:
Theorem 2 If the investor follows the toehold strategy S 1 , then he buys a toehold from the shareholder A offering the price X 0 for her share and then in the post-toehold offer he offers the price
for a share, in which case the shareholders will sell their shares with probability
the investor can takeover the firm with probability
and can expect for the profit
As we see from Theorems 1, 2, the no-toehold and toehold strategies yield the same profit Π 0 = Π 1 and the same probability σ 0 = σ 1 = n+1 2n+1 of selling their shares by the shareholders in the tender offers. On the other hand, the prices for a share and the probabilities P 0 and P 1 of takeover the firm are different for these two strategies. The precise estimate of the differences P 1 −P 0 and X 1 −X 0 will be given in Corollary 1. Now, let us consider a simple example.
A firm with 3 shareholders
In case of 3-shareholders (which corresponds to n = 1) the values of all parameters from Theorems 1 and 2 can be easily calculated:
is the probability that shareholders will sell their shares to the investor for the price: -X 0 = 4/9 suggested by the investor in the no-toehold strategy, -P 0 = 20/27 is the probability of taking over the firm in no-toehold strategy; -Π 0 = 8/9 is the expected profit of the investor in the no-toehold strategy; -σ 1 = 2/3 is the probability that a shareholder will tender her share to the investor for the price: -X 1 = 2/3 suggested by the investor in the post-toehold tender offer, -P 1 = 8/9 is the probability of taking over the firm in the toehold strategy, -Π 1 = 8/9 is the expected profit of the investor in the toehold strategy.
Looking at these data, we see that both strategies yield the same profit but the toehold strategy is much better than the no-toehold strategy in the sense of probability of takeover the firm.
It turns out that the same situation happens for all n ∈ N, see Corollary 1 below. In this corollary we shall prove that the difference P 1 − P 0 of probabilities for the toehold and no-toehold strategies is strictly positive and has order
Upper and lower bounds for parameters of the model
In this section we present the lower and upper bounds for the parameters of our models that appear in Theorem 2. Our main result is the following theorem that will be proved in Section 8.
Theorem 3
The parameters of the models lie in the following intervals:
Looking at the bounds for the probabilities P 0 , P 1 and the prices X 0 , X 1 we can notice that P 0 < P 1 and X 0 < X 1 . An estimation of the differences P 1 − P 0 and X 1 − X 0 is given in the following corollary of Theorem 3.
can be interpreted as the price for the information that the investor possesses a toehold.
Conclusion
The analysis of our models witnesses that both strategies (toehold and no toehold) of taking over the firm with 2n + 1 shareholders yield the same profit Π 0 = Π 1 ≈ n π but the probability
of taking over for the toehold strategy is higher than the corresponding probability P 0 ≈
Explicit analytic expressions for the parameters of the models
For deriving the lower and upper bounds presented in Theorem 3 we shall transform the binomial sums appearing in the expressions of the parameters of our models and obtain precise analytic formulas for these parameters, after which we shall evaluate them using some bounds on central binomial coefficients and simple bounds giving by Taylor series. Our principal tool in finding explicit analytic expressions for the parameters of the model is use of incomplete beta functions.
By definition, the beta function is the function
depending on two real positive parameters a, b. For fixed a, b the function
on the variable x ∈ [0, 1] is called the incomplete beta function. A remarkable property of the incomplete beta function is that for positive integer numbers a, b its value is proportional to a tail of the binomial series:
This equality plays a fundamental role in our subsequent arguments and will be referred to as the beta-equality. For the proof of the beta-equality and other information on (incomplete) beta functions, we refer the reader to the survey paper of Dutka [Dutka] . Beta functions will be used in the proof of the following theorem that gives explicit analytic formulas for the parameters describing the no-toehold and toehold strategies.
Theorem 4
The parameters of the models can be calculated by the following formulas:
suggested by the investor in the no-toehold strategy can be found by the formula
2. The probability
of taking over the firm in the no-toehold strategy can be found as
The expected profits
of the investor can be found by
4. The probability
of takeover the firm in the post-toehold strategy is equal to
The price
for a share offered by the investor in the post-toehold tender offer can be calculated as
Proof 1. To deduce the formula for the price X 0 , we use the beta-equality (2) with parameters a = n + 1 and b = n. In this case we get the equality
For x = 1 2 , this equality turns into:
Then (3) can be written as:
2(2n+1) the latter formula yields the required formula for the price X 0 :
2. By analogy we deduce the formula for the probability
of takeover the firm in the no-toehold strategy. Writing down the beta-equality (2) for the parameters a = n + 1 and b = n + 1, we get
After suitable rearrangements, for x = σ 0 = n+1 2n+1 the equality (6) transforms into the desired equality:
The formula for the profits
follows from the observation that
4. Taking into account that σ 1 = σ 0 = n+1 2n+1 and looking at the formula for X 0 proved in Theorem 4(1), we see that
5. The beta-equation (2) written for a = n and b = n yields:
Some lower and upper bounds
In this section we shall prove some lower and upper bounds for subformulas composing the formulas from Theorem 4. We shall need the following known inequalities, which can be easily proved by calculating the corresponding derivatives.
Lemma 1 For every n ∈ N and a real number x > 0 the following inequalities hold:
These lower and upper bounds will be used in the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 2
The following lower and upper bound hold for every n ∈ N:
Proof 1. First we transform the fraction 1 2n+1 as follows:
.
Taking into account that (2n + 1) ≥ 3, we get the necessary lower and upper bounds on the fraction
2. To evaluate the power 1 −
n we shall use Lemma 1(3). The lower bound can be obtained as follows:
Here we used the inequality (2n + 1) ≥ 3.
In a similar way we obtain the upper bound for 1 −
3. To get the lower bound for the integral
n dt we apply Lemma 1(3) to the function (1 − t 2 ) n and its integral:
By analogy we deduce the upper bound:
4. To get the lower bound for the integral
n−1 dt we apply the bounds from Lemma 1(3) to the function (1 − t 2 ) n−1 :
Evaluating the central binomial coefficients
In this section we derive some lower and upper bounds for the central binomial coefficients .
Proof The upper bound r n < 1 12n is well-known and can be found in [Robbins] . The lower bound for r n will be derived from the lower bound
proved by Maria in [Maria] , and the lower bound for 1 2n+1 from Lemma 2(1):
Using Lemma 3, we shall prove the following lower and upper bounds for the central binomial coefficients:
Lemma 4 The lower and upper bounds
hold for every n ∈ N.
Proof By Lemma 3, we get So, it suffices to prove the lower and upper bounds for e r2n−2rn . Lemma 3 guarantees that
Applying Lemma 1(1), we get 
and then we can apply the lower bound from Lemma 1(1) to conclude that 
Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 can be derived from Theorem 4 and Lemmas 2 and 3 by routine arithmetic calculations. This will be done in eight subsections corresponding to the parameters evaluated in Theorem 3. In fact, for n = 1, Theorem 3 can be proved using the data from Section 2.1. So, from now on we assume that n ≥ 2.
Evaluating the price X 0
By Theorem 4(1),
Using the upper bound from Lemma 2(4) and the lower bounds from Lemma 2(2) and 4, we get the required upper bound for X 0 :
Using the lower bound from Lemma 2(4) and the upper bounds from Lemma 2(2) and 4, we get the required lower bound for X 0 :
Evaluating the price X 1
Using the upper bounds from Lemmas 4 and 2(4), we get the required upper bound for X 1 :
Using the lower bound from Lemmas 4 and 2(4), we get the required lower bound for X 1 :
8.3 Evaluating the probability P 0 By Theorem 4(2),
This formula and upper bounds from Lemmas 4 and 2(3) imply the upper bound for P 0 : Using the lower bound from Lemmas 2(2,4) and 4, we get the required lower bound for X 1 : Substituting to this formula the upper and lower bounds from Lemmas 3 and 2(2), we get the upper and lower bounds for Π 0 : 
